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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TAMPA DIVISION
BARBARA BARLOW,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:11-cv-71-T-30EAJ
WALGREEN CO.,
Defendant.
________________________________________/
O RDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Dkt. 19), and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 31). The Court, having 
considered the motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that 
the motion should be denied in part, and granted in part, as stated herein.
Background
Plaintiff Barbara Barlow (“Barlow”) contends that Defendant Walgreen Co. 
(“Walgreen”) both discriminated against her on account of her disability and retaliated 
against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, and the 
Florida Civil Rights Act.
Plaintiff Barlow suffers from the musculoskelatal disorders of spinal stenosis,1 
cervical disc disease, neural foraminal stenosis, and cervical radiculopathy. As a result of
1A narrowing of the spine that puts pressure on the spinal cord and nerves, causing pain.
her conditions, Barlow has difficulty with heavy lifting, heavy pulling, and prolonged 
bending or stooping as such activities cause severe pain and muscle tightness in her upper 
back. Plaintiff can perform light lifting, and bend and stoop for short periods of time.
Barlow started working for Walgreen in October, 1995, and proceeded to work at 
Walgreen for the next 14 years. For the past seven years, Barlow has worked as a senior 
beauty advisor (“SBA”). As an SBA, Barlow was responsible for overseeing all aspects of 
the Walgreen cosmetics department. Her responsibilities included, among other things: (1) 
providing assistance to customers in the cosmetics department; (2) “coordinating, 
constructing, and maintaining Cosmetic Department displays, to include mandatory, 
promotional, seasonal, and sale merchandise displays in a timely, clean, and neat fashion;” 
(3) performing resets and revisions; (4) keeping counters and shelves clean and well- 
merchandised; (5) operating the cash register in the cosmetics department; (6) generally 
keeping track of cosmetic merchandise; and (7) ordering new cosmetic merchandise. As the 
senior beauty advisor, Barlow also supervised beauty advisors (“BAs”) in their duties.
Plaintiff’s impairments made it difficult for her to perform some of her duties. First, 
she had difficulty unloading merchandise on “truck days.” On “truck days,” which occurred 
approximately once to twice per week, a truck delivered merchandise to Walgreen in “totes,” 
which are plastic boxes weighing approximately two pounds when empty and up to fifty 
pounds when filled. Walgreen employees would typically transport the totes into their 
section by lifting the totes onto a cart and then wheeling the cart into their section. Although 
Barlow could lift the lighter totes onto the cart, transport the cart from the stockroom to her
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department, place the products on the shelves, and return the cart when she was finished, she 
experienced difficulty lifting the heavier totes onto the cart.
When presented with a heavier tote, Barlow would ask for assistance if other 
employees happened to be around. If there was no one available to help, Barlow would work 
with the lighter totes until someone became available, take the individual items out of the 
heavy tote and place them on the cart, and/or simply lift the heavy tote herself regardless of 
the pain. According to Barlow, she performed her duties on truck days in the above­
described manner for many years without any disruption in the workplace.
Second, Plaintiff experienced some difficulty performing resets and revisions. A 
revision involves merchandise relocation of a relatively minor nature, for example, moving 
one brand of merchandise from one shelf to another. A reset, by contrast, is a large-scale 
“face-lift” of a department, taking place approximately once a year to every couple of 
months.2 In moving merchandise from one shelf to another in furtherance of a revision or 
a reset, Barlow had difficulty relocating merchandise on the very bottom shelf, as she would 
experience intense pain from crouching for long periods of time. As a result, Barlow 
typically had the BAs she supervised re-stock the bottom shelf. According to Plaintiff, it was 
not uncommon for cosmetic employees to ask for help completing a reset, and/or a revision, 
and there was no requirement that an SBA or a BA complete an entire reset or revision on 
his or her shift. Indeed, doing so was often not possible due to customer volume.
2The parties appear to disagree whether the term ‘revision’ or ‘reset’ should apply to the relatively 
modest merchandise relocation or to the more wholesale reorganization (and vice-versa). The correct usage 
of these two terms, however, is immaterial for the purposes of this Order.
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Third, Plaintiff had difficulty lifting heavy merchandise for customers. For example, 
if customers purchased a gallon of milk, or a twelve-pack of bottled water, Barlow would be 
unable to pick up these items in order to place them into a bag. Instead, she would slide the 
merchandise into the bag, and/or reach out with her scanner to ring up these items.3
Despite Plaintiff’ s limitations, she received high marks from her coworkers and 
supervisors for many years, being described as a good and capable employee, and a hard 
worker who did her job without complaining. Indeed, in her March 17, 2009, performance 
review her then-supervisor (and store manager) Darrell Foust rated Barlow at the highest 
possible rating of “exceeds expectations” in ten out of eleven categories (she received a 
“meets expectations” rating in the remaining category). Foust had supervised Barlow in her 
role as SBA for the previous three years, and, significantly, specifically listed “resets and 
revisions” as one of Barlow’s strengths.
It seems that Plaintiff’s problems at work only started after Diane Campogni took over 
as store manager on September 1, 2009. Soon after Campogni became manager, Campogni 
informed Barlow that she would have to start working evening shifts, and that during those 
shifts she would have to perform the janitorial duties which were previously performed by 
the overnight assistant manager. Barlow informed Campogni that because of her conditions 
it would be difficult for her to lift the heavy industrial mop, and/or the heavy trash can lids.
Campogni understood Plaintiff to be requesting an accommodation, so she insisted 
that Plaintiff provide her with a doctor’s note, detailing her limitations. Barlow explained
3Plaintiff also allegedly had additional, more minor, work limitations due to her impairments.
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the situation to her doctor and proceeded to get a note, which she subsequently gave to 
Campogni. The note, in relevant part, stated:
Barbara is in need of slight assistance in her work duties/details. She 
is medically able to work but Heavy Lifting, Heavy Pushing, or Heavy Pulling 
will aggravate her Cervical Musculature Disorder. Also Bending Over or 
Stooping can only be done for short periods of time. If these activities persist 
she suffers from severe pain and muscle tightness of the upper back (cervical 
and thoracic). These symptoms result from her medical conditions...Barbara 
has been a good patient and I believe she is a hard worker who wants to remain 
employed and work but is struggling medically with her current duties. Please 
help her to find some solution to these issues. I would be glad to speak on her 
behalf at the numbers listed below.
Upon receiving the letter, Campogni stated that the note was not good enough and 
dismissed it, arguing that it insufficiently explained Plaintiff’ s limitations. Campogni 
requested that Plaintiff obtain additional information from her doctor, but declined to accept 
Dr. Kappeler’s invitation to speak with him about Plaintiff’s impairments because Campogni 
was “not required” to do so.
Around this time, Campogni brought Barlow into her office and asked Barlow to 
make a list of her physical limitations. Barlow proceeded to do so. For example, she wrote 
“can’t lift a gallon of milk [but] would slide [it] into the bag.” Campogni allegedly became 
angry over Barlow’s qualifying her limitations in this way, and, as a result, threw Barlow’s 
initial list into the trash. Thereafter, Barlow simply wrote what Campogni told her to write.
Upon detailing her limitations, Campogni remarked that Barlow was “obviously 
disabled,” and, as she would be a liability to Walgreen, she would no longer be allowed to
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work in the store. Accordingly, Campogni removed Barlow from the schedule and told her 
to apply for disability benefits.
Although Barlow originally filed a disability claim pursuant to Campogni’s 
instructions, she later withdrew her claim as she considers herself capable of doing the work 
and not to be disabled (Barlow states that she views a disabled individual as a person without 
arms and legs). Because Campogni refused to schedule Barlow for work, Barlow decided 
to withdraw funds from her Walgreen profit sharing account. As she could not do so unless 
she was coded as retired, Barlow agreed to be classified as retired, and received the funds.
Summary Judgment Standard
Motions for summary judgment should only be granted when the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322 (1986). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there be 
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986)(emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to the claimed causes of action 
will identify which facts are material. Id. Throughout this analysis, the judge must examine 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences 
in his or her favor. Id. at 255.
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Once a party properly makes a summary judgment motion by demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, the 
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings through the use of affidavits, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, and designate specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Chelates, 477 U.S. at 324. The evidence must be 
significantly probative to support the claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. This Court 
may not decide a genuine factual dispute at the summary judgment stage. Fernandez v. 
Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 1990). “[I]f factual issues are 
present, the Court must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Warrior Tombigbee Transp. 
Co., Inc. v.M /VNanFung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983). A dispute about a material 
fact is genuine and summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. 
at 248; Hoffman v. AlliedCorp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1990). However, there must exist 
a conflict in substantial evidence to pose a question for the fact finder. Verbraeken v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1989).
Discussion
I. Plaintiff’s Disability Discrimination Claims
Both parties agree that, since the alleged discriminatory conduct in this case took 
place after January 1, 2009, the American with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 
(“ADAAA”) applies. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The ADAAA amended the ADA to, among other
Page 7 of 15
things, promulgate a more liberal standard of the term “disabled,” making it significantly
easier for a plaintiff to show disability. Indeed, the new regulations state that:
The primary purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with 
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the 
Amendments Act’s purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under 
the ADA, the definition of ‘disability’ in this part shall be construed broadly 
in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms 
of the ADA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4).
Despite the changes brought about by the ADAAA, the elements of a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case remain the same. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled; (2) 
is a qualified individual; and (3) was unlawfully discriminated against because of her 
disability. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted); McCoy v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 510 F.Supp.2d 739, 748 (M.D. Fla. 
2007).4 Walgreen argues that Plaintiff fails to meet each of these three elements.
A. Is Plaintiff Disabled?
Under the ADAAA, a disability is defined as, among other things, a “physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(I). An impairment qualifies as a disability if:
it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life 
activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment 
need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from 
performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially 
limiting. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
4Moreover, as the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) is construed in conformity with the ADA, as 
amended, the Court will discuss the claims asserted under these two statutes together. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Avatar Properties, Inc., 714 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
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The new regulations go on to explain that the term “substantially limits” is to be broadly 
construed “in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms 
of the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(I). Major life activities are defined as, among other 
things, “performing manual tasks...walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, 
...working...[and the] operation of a major bodily function, including... the... musculoskeletal” 
function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff argues that she suffers from physical disabilities which limit one of her 
major life activities. Specifically, she contends that her impairments of spinal stenosis, 
cervical disc disease, neural foraminal stenosis, and cervical radiculopathy, substantially limit 
her major life activity of the operation of her musculoskeletal system.
Plaintiff’s impairments all undisputedly affect her musculoskeletal function. The fact 
that her disorders cause her to have great difficulty lifting even relatively light objects such 
as a gallon of milk, and that she has great difficulty crouching for more than short periods 
of time both testify to the seriousness of her musculoskeletal problems. Her impairments put 
her at a disadvantage as compared to “most people in the general population,” and certainly 
qualify as a significant restriction. As the new regulations do not even require that the 
limitation be “significant or severe,” taking Plaintiff’ s allegations as true, Plaintiff’ s 
impairments substantially limit her musculoskeletal system; thus, Plaintiff qualifies as 
disabled under the ADAAA. See 29 CFR § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii), (j)(1)(ii).
Defendant argues that Barlow is not disabled, even under the more lenient standards 
of the ADAAA. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has never stated that she was in any way
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disabled, and thus cannot be thought to be disabled under the ADAAA. While Plaintiff 
disavows that she is “disabled” and that she is fully capable of doing her work, such 
statements are not tantamount to stating that she does not suffer from a legally recognized 
disability. Indeed, according to Plaintiff she did not consider herself disabled because she 
believes that disabled persons are people without arms and legs. While Plaintiff has declined 
to label herself as disabled, she has stated that she suffers from the various musculoskeletal 
disorders described herein, and has repeatedly detailed her consequent physical limitations 
resulting therefrom. As such, taking Plaintiff’ s allegations as true, she is qualified as 
disabled under the ADAAA for the reasons discussed above.
Moreover, Plaintiff has also presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue 
of material fact with respect to whether she qualifies as disabled under the “regarded as” 
prong of the ADAAA, which prohibits employers from discriminating against those 
employees which they perceive to have a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(c); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). Among other things, Plaintiff presents evidence that Campogni 
specifically told Plaintiff that she could no longer work for Walgreen because she was 
disabled, and therefore a liability to Walgreen.
B. Is Plaintiff a Qualified Individual?
Whether Plaintiff is a “qualified individual” under the ADAAA turns on the question 
of whether she is able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable 
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8). Here, Plaintiffhas impairments which make Plaintiff 
unable to perform mildly heavy lifting, heavy pushing and pulling, and prolonged bending
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or stooping. Thus, whether Plaintiff is a qualified individual turns on the question of whether 
these physical tasks are essential functions of Plaintiff’ s position.
A job duty may constitute an essential function if, among other things: “(i) ...the 
reason the position exists is to perform that function;” (ii) the job function cannot easily be 
distributed among other employees; and/or (iii) the job duty is highly specialized, the 
employee being specifically hired to perform that particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 
(n)(2).
Here, the SBA position is undisputedly not a specialized position, so prong (iii) is 
inapplicable. Defendant argues that lifting and crouching constitute essential functions under 
prong (ii) as Walgreen is unable to distribute the duties Plaintiff cannot perform to other 
workers. Plaintiff, however, has ample evidence to contradict this assertion. Indeed, 
Plaintiff contends that numerous Walgreen employees were available to (and did) help her 
with the limited tasks she could not perform, and/or had difficulty performing.
Defendant also argues that bending and lifting constituted essential functions under 
the first prong, arguing that the reason that the SBA position exists is to perform certain 
functions which importantly include, among other things, the tasks of heavy lifting and 
sustained crouching.
In order to determine if these job duties were indeed essential functions, a Court may 
consider as evidence, among other things: “(i) the employer’s judgment as to which functions 
are essential; (ii) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv)
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the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function” and the past work 
experience of Plaintiff, and others, on the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(3); Calvo v. Walgreen 
Corp., 340 Fed. Appx. 618, 623 (11th Cir. 2009).
Here, Defendant argues, among other things, that Campogni considered bending and 
lifting to be essential job duties, that Defendant’s written job description required such 
duties, that Campogni actually required Plaintiff to perform these functions, that Plaintiff was 
required to devote a significant amount of time to performing such duties, and that 
eliminating these duties would fundamentally alter the SBA position.
While Defendant has presented significant evidence tending to show that lifting and 
bending were essential job duties, Plaintiff has presented ample evidence to the contrary. 
Indeed, taking Plaintiff’ s evidence as true, a reasonable juror could certainly conclude that 
lifting and bending constituted merely marginal duties of the job. Among other things, 
Plaintiff presents evidence that her former boss had found that she had exceeded expectations 
in her role as an SBA, that she worked as an SBA for years without problems, that her 
limitations did not disrupt customer service, that many employees were available to assist her 
in the few tasks she could not perform herself, and that others who had similarly asked for 
help with lifting had been accommodated.
In short, Plaintiff’s evidence gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether such tasks were essential. Indeed, the recent Eleventh Circuit case of Calvo v. 
Walgreen Corporation, 2009 WL 2435700 (11th Cir. Aug. 11), is in accord. In Calvo, the 
court reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment for Walgreen on plaintiff’ s ADA
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claim, finding there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether lifting and carrying 
were essential functions of the Walgreen’ assistant manager position. Id. at *4, *7. Of note, 
the court found that the fact that one of the Calvo’s supervisors had stated that Calvo had 
performed the job “fine” for a period of four years belied Walgreen’ contention that lifting 
and carrying were essential job duties. Id. at *4.
C. Did Walgreen Discriminate against Plaintiff?
Plaintiff argues that Walgreen discriminated against her by removing her from the 
schedule because of her disability, instead of offering her a reasonable accommodation. 
Plaintiff contends that she could perform the essential duties of her job, and that Walgreen 
could have offered her a reasonable accommodation by offering her slight assistance with 
the difficulties that she had lifting heavier objects, just as it had in the past.
Walgreen contends that the lifting duties were essential functions of the SBA position, 
and that, as a result, Walgreen had no duty to reassign them. While Walgreen is correct in 
its contention that an employer has no duty to reassign essential duties, for the reasons 
discussed above, there exists a dispute of material fact as to whether the SBA lifting (and 
bending) duties were essential functions of that position. Accordingly, it is not appropriate 
to rule on summary judgment on this issue.
Moreover, as there exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to all three 
elements of Plaintiff’ s disability discrimination claim, Plaintiff’ s claim survives summary 
judgment.
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II. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claims
In order to bring a disability retaliation claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust her 
administrative remedies by filing a charge of retaliatory discrimination with the EEOC. 
Green v. Elixir Industries, Inc., 152 F. App’x 838, 840 (11th Cir. 2005); Thomas v. Miami 
Dade Public Health Trust, 369 F. App’x 19, 22 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that any “acts of 
retaliation that occurred prior to the date of the EEOC charge that were not included in the 
charge were not exhausted and could not be considered by the district court.”)
Here, Plaintiff both failed to check the retaliation box, and failed to raise any 
allegation of retaliation in her EEOC charge. As a result, Plaintiff’s retaliation charges are 
administratively barred. Notably, in Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff presents no argument as to why these charges should not be 
barred.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. Defendant Walgreen Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 19) is hereby
denied with respect to Plaintiff Barbara Barlow’s disability discrimination claims (Counts 
I & II).
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2. Defendant Walgreen Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 19) is hereby 
granted with respect to Plaintiff Barbara Barlow’s retaliation claims (Counts III & IV). 
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on March 14, 2012.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record
S:\Odd\2011\11-cv-71.msj.19.frm
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